



Abstract: Electricitymarkets around the world are becomingmore competi
tive, partly in response to technological changes. Successful restructuring
requires an understanding ofthe sources ofmonopoly power in the indus
try, and separation ofcompetitive from natural monopoly elements. Com
petitive wholesale electricity markets require transparent regulatory and
cross-subsidy mechanisms. Such changes in turn make public ownership
less relevant for protecting consumers. Competitive markets are also more
risky for owners, and governments are not ideally suited to financing large
and very risky business ventures. The arguments are illustrated by refe
rence to the reforms undertaken in Australia in the last decade.
Resumen: Los mercados de electricidad en el mundo se están tornando más
competitivos, en parte como respuesta a cambios tecnológicos. Una
reestructuración exitosa requiere comprender las fuentes del poder mo
nopólico en la industria y la separación entre elementos competitivos y de
monopolio natural. Los mercados competitivos de ventas al mayoreo
de electricidad requieren mecanismos transparentes de regulación y de
subsidios cruzados. A su vez, estos cambios hacen que la propiedad pública
sea menos relevante para proteger a los consumidores. Los mercados
competitivos son también más riesgosos para las empresas, y los gobiernos
no están capacitados idealmente para financiar negocios grandes y muy
riesgosos. Los argumentos se ilustran con las reformas llevadas a cabo en
Australia durante la última década.
I
n most countries, government firms have dominated the supply of
electricity. Even in countries with extensive private ownership, such
as the United States, Germany, Denmark and Norway, governments
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have controlled prices and regulated the industry in other ways. The
traditional explanation for this situation is that electricity supply is a
“natural monopoly”.
Supplying electricity across an integrated network requires coor
dination and scheduling ofsuppliers for technical reasons and also to
minimize costs. “Command and control” mechanisms within a firm
may be more effective than decentralized market processes at solving
such scheduling and coordination problems. Furthermore, if exist
ing customers require additional electricity, or additional customers
in a given area wish to take electricity service, it usually will be
cheaper to use the existing network rather than duplicate that mfra
structure. In many cases, additional service can be supplied without
requiring any expansion in the existing trunk network. Many draw
the inference, therefore, that an electricity network will be operated
at lowest cost when one firm owns it.
When there is a sole supplier of a good or service, however, that
suppliercan, byrestrictingoutput, charge a price in excess ofmarginal
cost. Since the value of the product to consumers can then greatly
exceed the costs of producing it, the outcome wiil be inefficient.
Monopoly control of a “bottleneck” facility, such as a transmission
network, can produce particularly large inefficiencies. The monopoly
owner would have an incentive to both underpay firms supplying
electricity to the network and overcharge distributors taking electric
ity from it.
It has also been suggested that there are lesser, but nonetheless
non-trivial, monopoly problems associated with electricitygeneration.
This notion may be mistaken in so far as it is often based on a flawed
econometric model of the production process. Even so, we will argue
that economies ofscale in the construction ofnew generating capacity
imply that the capacity expansion path in a competitive industry is
probably less than the most efficient imaginable.
Nevertheless, natural monopoiycharacteristics ofelectricity sup
ply cannot by themselves explain greater government involvement in
this industry. After alT, the notion that governments intervene in eco
nomic activity in order to increase efficiency is grossly atvariancewith
the evidence. We will instead argue that political intervention is
targeted at other goals. Inefficiencies associated with a competitive
electricity market may reduce the opportunity cost of government
intervention, however, and thus could help to explain why interven
tion occurs more frequently in that industry.
Whenthe efficiency ofcompetitive outcomes increases, the oppor
tunity cost of government involvement also increases. Competition
between electricity generators has recently become more feasible and
more effective at delivering lower costs and prices and better customer
service. Partly as a result, many countries — including the United
Kingdom, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand and Australia — have
restructured and privatized their electricity supply firms. Substan
tial restructuring has begun even in the United States where private
firms predominate. Several states are establishing competitivewhoie
sale electricity markets and asking utilities to divest themselves of
generatingplant and surrender control oftheir transmission network.
We shall use the experience in Australia to illustrate the potential
benefits and costs ofrestructuring and privatization in the electricity
industry.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope in Electricity Supply
Many recent reforms have drastically reduced the integration of the
electricity supply industry. While technological changes have facili
tated this trend, another influence has been a better understanding of
the economic conditions ofthe industry.
1.1. Operating Economies ofScale
Firms using technologies that exhibit increasing returns to scale do
not necessarily experience iower costs as output expands. Firms
combine many activities, each ofwhich uses a technology with differ
ent economies ofscale. For example, management and supervision are
part ofthe activities ofevery firm. Managers need to acquire informa
tion, give directions to employees, ensure that directions are complied
with and so forth. These activities are likely to exhibit decreasing
returns to scale. The overali economies of scale depend on the mix of
activities, and how that mix vanes as output expands.
For electric distributors in particular, metering use, repairing
equipment, processing bilis, and responding to customer complaints
are ah labor intensive, decreasing returns to scaie, activities that are
aiso significant components oftotal cost. Furthermore, as a network
expands geographicaliy, travel costs become a larger part of the cost
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ofboth metering and fault repair, raising the average costs ofservice.
To offset sorne of these costs, the firm can establish regional offices.
However, this increases the number oforganizational layers and thus
is likely to raise service costs per unit ofoutput supplied. An increase
in the number ofcustomers of an electricity utility is also likely to be
associated with an increase in the proportion ofsmall customers, and
an increase in the proportion of customers located in sparsely popu
lated regions. Both of these factors will increase the average costs of
supply as output expands.
Electric utilities can also often increase sales, the number of
customers served, orthe range ofproducts supplied without increasing
network capacity. Conversely, reductions in sales, customers, or prod
uct range do not usually allow the firm to save on capital costs. Capital
investments represent a sunk cost that is irrelevant to the cost of
marginal changes in output, so long as supply remains unconstrained
by current network capacity. For short run changes in output, therefore,
the service costs, which exhibit diseconomies ofscale, are dominant.
The way new generating capacity is added to an electricity supply
system accentuates the short run increasing costs. Most electric
ity systems experience substantial daily and seasonal demand fluc
tuations. Periods ofpeak demand may only last a few hours each year.
Plant used only in peakperiods therefore usuallyhas a low capital cost
but, in consequence, a high operating cost. In fact, the construction of
base load capacity is justified only when the saving in fuel and other
operating costs over the expected life of the plant has a present value
sufficient to cornpensate for the large initial capital costs. Thus, gas
turbines are less expensive to build than large coal, oil or nuclear base
load plant but use a premium fuel. Similarly, in a mixed hydro and
thermal system, the “fuel cost” ofhydroelectricity is the opportunity cost
ofthe stored water. Consequently, hydro capacity should be used inpeak
periods when the cost ofthermal generation would otherwise be higher.
Older, higher cost plant is also used to produce higher leveis of
output. Newer plant often embodies technological advances that re
duce operating costs. The maintenance costs, and lost time for main
tenance, for older plants are also higher.
The result of these factors is that increases in the output of
electricity in the shortrun are accompanied by rapidlyrisingmarginal
costs. Empirical analyses claimingto reveal increasingreturns to scale
in supplying electricity invariably include capital as a factor of pro
duction, and thus implicitly examine a long run supply function.
1.2. Investment Economies ofScale
The fact that new generating capacity is added in “lumps” indicates
that there are economies ofscale associated with investrnent. Many of
the costs of adding to existing capacity, such as site preparation,
engineering design, arranging transport of materials, procuring con
struction equipment and, to a lesser extent, the construction time, do
not depend greatly on the size ofthe capacity increment. By delaying
construction of new plant a larger plant size is warranted, allowing
lower average construction costs per MW ofgenerating capacity.
Figure 1 illustrates the traditional model of efficient capacity
expansion when the capacity ofnew plant is fixed and demand fluctu
ates across peak and off-peak periods. For simplicity, marginal oper
ating costs have been taken as constant at c up to the current
capacity q*.
In the left panel of Figure 1, the difference between the demand
price in each period and e 1 can be viewed as an implicit demand for
capacity expansion. Since new capacity will be jointly provided for all
periods, these demands can be summed vertically to give an aggregate
dernand for new capacity. The subsequent discussion will focus on this
“excess demand” while ignoring complications arising from the multi
period nature ofelectricity demand.
The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates the “trapezoid rule”. This
argues that capacity should be expanded when the trapezoid of con
sumer surpius gain frorn expanding capacity from q 0 to q 1 equals the
cost ofthat increment (q 1 —q 0 )e 2 . This will be true when the areas of
the two shaded triangles in the figure are equal.
The efficient capacity expansion path will constrain demand in
sorne periods — otherwise, the implicit value of new capacity would
never match its added cost. Ifdemand is not rationed by higher prices
in “peak” periods it will be rationed through blackouts, brownouts or
other reductions in service quality.
Now suppose that capacity increments can be ofany size instead
of being fixed at (q 1 —q 0 ). There will be sorne economies of scale
associated with the production ofnew capacitybut eventually decreas
ing returns take over. The result will be a U-shaped average cost of
new capacity as illustrated in Figure 2.
Hartley and Kyle (1989) examine a simplified version of this
model where investment is the sole cost and where dernand grows
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demand growth at a fixed price. The result wilI be a stationary
sequence of investments of size 1 made at intervention price p as
illustrated in Figure 3. Immediately after each investment, prices fail
to p — 1. Prices then return to p over the following 1 units oftime.
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Figure 3. A Stationary sequence ofinvestments in capacity
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51Using this notation, the solution for the efficient investment size
J and investment time (or intervention price)p 0 can be written as the
solutions to the two equations:
SinceA(r1 0 ) > O for r> O:
R(PoIQ)<_LPQ_J
and the efficient investment path will not break even for r > O.
Equation (3) represents the “trapezoid rule” in this context. It implies
that the cost of the investment should equal the (undiscounted)
revenue arising from the increment in capacity. The efficient invest
ment path will, however, have low prices at the beginning of each
investment cycle. Thus, the discounted revenue will fail short of the
investment cost. Also, from equations 4 and 5, the marginal cost of a
new investment is below average cost, implying from Figure 2 that the
efficient investment size is below the level that minimizes average
investment costs.
It can be shown that even as r —* O, so discounting makes no
difference, the optimal investment size remains below the level that
minimizes average cost. Our linear demand specification implies
consumers are risk averse and hence value more frequent, and there
fore smaller, investments with their associated smaller fluctuations
in prices and marginal valuations ofelectricity supply.
If the investment path is constrained to ensure that the present
value ofrevenue is sufficient to coverinvestment costs, it can be shown
that the optimal investment sizeI solves:
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C (Ir)
— C’ (Ir)
= [ricA’ (rI)A (rIo)
+A (rlc)].
‘c 1 +A (rIo)
A “free entry equilibrium” is an investment path that is invulner
able to profitable one-time entry when firms behave competitively in
the output market. Explicitly, it is an investment rule (pE, ‘E) where
ah available capacity is used to produce output, investments of size
‘E made at intervention pricepE do not lose money, and no investment
made when p <PE makes money, assuming ah future investments
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There is also a “minimum intervention price equilibriuin” where
an entrant undertaking a new investment contemplates a sequence of
investments and assumes all future entrants will also contemplate the
same investment sequence. This equilibrium is thus less competitive,
but it is vulnerable to one-time entry since by, definition, (pE, ‘E) is the
only investment rule invulnerable to such entry. It can be shown that
the investment size ‘M in the minimum intervention price equilibrium
solves:
C(1M) 1 rr
— (‘Al) = +rI A’ (rIM)].
Using equations (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8) it can be shown that
<JE <l and PM <PE <Pc although it is not in general possible to
rankp 0 relative to the other intervention prices. The ranking of the
intervention prices implies that the constrained optimum cannot be
achieved when anyone is free to add capacity. The unconstrained
optimum may not be vulnerable to entry, however, since investments
along that path do not raise sufficient revenue to cover costs.
These results should generalize. Since l, is hikely to be less than
the level that minimizes average investment costs, costs would not be
covered if consumers were charged the marginal cost of capacity
expansion. Furthermore, if prices ration demand to the available
capacity, and the interest rate r> O, the discounted revenue from an
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gain associatedwith an additionto capacity. Finally, competitive firms
will invest “too often” and choose an investment size 1 that is “too
small” relative to the constrained optimum. Each new entrant effec
tively has sorne “monopoly power”. By choosing a smaller investment
size equilibrium prices will be higher.
While the competitive outcorne rnight be less than fully efficient,
rnore frequent and smaller investments would also provide sorne
benefits. Consumers value a srnoother path of capacity expansion
since it is likely to lead to greater stability and predictability in price
movements and make it easier to plan their own future investments.
In addition, more frequent investments may lead to greater techno
logical change.
An important implication of the analysis is that investrnent in
capacity, and the production of output using a given capacity, ought
to be treated as two separate production processes. Econometric
analyses that include capital along with fuel and labor as factors in a
“timeless” production process will misconstrue the economies of scale
in electricity generation. In particular, while the model implies that
‘W 1 and even the efficient investrnent levell 0 are ah “too small”
to fully exploit investrnent economies of scale, this is nojustification
whatsoever for combining generating plant into portfolios within a
single firm. The model implies that there would be no reduction in
costs resulting frorn such a combination.
The aboye discussion assumed a competitive output market. If
only a few firms own rnost of the capacity, however, Green and
Newberry (1992) show that the firms will have an incentive to restrict
output relative to the available capacity. The result wihl be, as hap
pened in the U. K., inefficient use ofexisting capacity and an artificial
stirnulus to investment.
Aggregating generators into a small number of firms decreases
competition in the wholesale electricity market. The ostensible bene
fits from exploiting economies ofscale, which are supposed to offset the
losses associated with garning in the wholesale market, are illusory.
1.3. Network Economies ofScale
Economies of scale are more pervasive in supplying distribution net
works. It will usually be prohibitively expensive to duplicate an
existing distribution network in order to extend supply to new con-
sumers. The main historical instances ofan entrant producing a new
network to partially replace an existing one have involved exploitation
of new technologies. Consider, for example, the telecommunications
market in the U. S.:
• MCI entered the long distance market by being the first firm to
exploit microwave technology in place ofland lines.
• U. S. Sprint based its entry into the same market on providing
an entire network based on optical fiber.
• Cellulartelephones based on satehlite andradiotechnologyhave
permitted competition in the local phone market.
• New technology may allow cable TV operators, and even electric
ity distributors to enterthe local telecornrnunications market in
theU. S.
New technologies might also allow electricity distribution net
works to be bypassed. For example, in June 1998, Plug Power
(http:llwww.plugpower.coml) introduced the first home to be supplied
with its total electricity needs by a fuel celi. Commercial production of
this system is planned for the year 2000.
New entrants have also found a niche in rnanynetworkindustries
by providing service to a different geographical area. For example,
early competitors in the telephone industry in the U. S. often supplied
service to the less densely settled suburban and rural areas that had
been ignored by the Beil companies.
Networks have also been duplicated. At the end ofthe nineteenth
century, competing local telephone networks, each using the same
technology, served many cities in the U. S. Lubbock, Texas still has
two competing local electricity distributors with duphicate sets of
wires. In Australia, the telecommunications carriers, Teistra and
Optus, are currently constructing duplicate fiber optic networks.
We should also note that construction of new transmission or
distribution unes does not display decreasing costs. Engineering firms
that compete for other harge construction projects can also compete
effectively for construction jobs in the power industry.
Maintenance of the transmission and distribution network also
could be organized on a competitive basis. While routine maintenance
on a given power line might be done at least cost on a single trip, and
opportunities to share plant and equipment could provide sorne
economies of scale, offsetting diseconomies in large firms imply that
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several firms could compete to provide maintenance service to any
one utility.
A retailer may wish to remain responsible for maintenance,
however, since consumers value reduced line outages, rapid fault
repair, consistent voltage and other factors dependent 011 une quality.
Even so, sorne consumers are happy to take electricity service from a
firm other than the owner ofthe local distribution network. Australian
governments have recently instituted a regulatory framework to con
trol the price and other conditions underwhich competitors can access
networks. These access regimes appear to have diminished the mo
nopoly power oflocal electricity distributors.
There is roorn for debate, however, about the effectiveness of
access regimes. Regulated access prices are inevitably based on arbi
trary cost allocations and accounting conventions. Also, the firms
operating the network often have proprietary information and can
shift costs from other components of their business to the network
operations. It is thus often very difficult to ensure non-discriminatory
access and effective competition.
New Zealand has taken the view that monopolistic behavior of
the wires business is highly circumscribed by the ability ofcustomers
to by-pass their host distributor through an effective access regime. In
New Zealand there is now virtually no regulation over the distribution
ofelectricity apart from the general laws relating to anti-competitive
behavior.
1.4. Vertical Integration
While distribution networks are susceptible to monopoly control,
many other aspects of infrastructure industries are conducive to
competitive supply. Nevertheless, we typically find that the owner
of the high voltage electricity transmission grid also generates all or
rnost of the electricity supplied to that grid and supplies services to
customers.
Cost savings from cornbining related activities might explain
these outcomes. Yet it is hard to believe, for example, that the cost
savings from combining electricity generation, transmission and dis
tribution would exceed the cost savings from combining metering,
billing and customer service for supplying gas, electricity and water
services.
The network characteristics of infrastructure supply industries
are a more plausible explanation for vertical integration. The network
owner is both a monopolist to its consumers and a monopsonist for
suppliers to the network. This “two-sided monopoly” can create large
efficiency losses in a disaggregated industry. A takeover ofthe suppli
ers by the network owner would not only lead to increased profits for
the whole industry but also would benefit consumers. This is so even
though the final monopoly outcome would still be inefficient.’
When the exercise ofmonopoly power by a network owner can be
controlled, however, there may be significant gains from separating
the potentially more cornpetitive generating sector from the transmis
sion and distribution parts ofthe business. This has been the philoso
phy behind the recent reforms in Australia, New Zealand, Argentina
and the U. K., although the promotion ofcompetition has been taken
furthest in the state ofVictoria in Australia.
1.5. Geographical Integration
The economies of scale associated with operating a local distribution
network are often limited geographically. For example, asrepaircrews
travel greater distances average costs increase. Even when a single
firm owns a more extensive network it splits operation and mainte
nance into serni-autonomous regional divisions, which could often be
run as separate firms without sacrificing economies of scale.
Geographical separation also allows the operating costs in the
different divisions to be compared with each other. This eases the task
ofregulating firms and provides potential competitors to take advan
tage of any access opportunities.
1.6. Contracting Out
Contracting out, or competitive tendering, can also be seen as a type
of “functional separation.” For example, the firm operating the high
1 If the monopolist can charge different prices to upstream or downstrearn suppliers or
purchasers, it could increase profits while expanding supply toward the efficient level. The
monopolist’s suppliers or customers are, however, likely to be made worse off by such price
discrimination. The upstream or downstream firms may conceal information to make price dis-.
crimination less feasible or effective. Vertical integration may alleviate these asymmetries in
inforrnatjon and benefit consumers as weIl as the monopoly network provider.
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voltage electricitynetwork and planning network expansions does not
have to construct or maintain the system.
A potential problem with mandating contracting out is that
economies ofscope might be sacrificed. Another problem is that sorne
activities that could be contracted out may be a critical component
of service quality. It may be important for firms to retain control of
these service dirnensions ifcompetition is to result in the best outcome
for consumers.
2. Public Ownership
It might be thought that the monopoly problems associated with
distribution networks explain why electricity (and other network)
firms are completely owned and operated by government enterprises
in rnany countries. For example, Klein and Roger (1996) observed:
Important policy issues exist because many users are dependent on a
common facility — such as an electricity network — that does not face
head-to-head competition ... Pressures for sorne kind of regulatory me
chanism arise soon after a new infrastructure network is set up.
A fundamental weakness ofthis explanation is that it appears to
be based on a “public interest” view ofpolitics. Ifpoliticians intervene
to promote efficient resource allocation, however, how can we explain
obviously inefficient policies like tariffs or subsidies?
In a world of complete information, only efficient policies could
garner majority support. 2 Inefficient policies could always be replaced
by alternatives that make sorne voters better off and no others worse
off. In practice, however, information is costly, and information is very
deficient in the political marketplace. Voters have weak incentives to
become informed, and inforrnation about candidate or party perform
ance is difficult to obtain. Many voters economize on information costs
by judging politicians on intentions rather than performance. Politi
cians also suifer from inadequate access to information when attempt
ing to control the behavior of civil servants or managers of publicly
owned firms.
2 This statement ignores dynamic effects. For example, Besley and Coate (1998) argue
that the inability ofcurrent governments to bind the actions offuture governments can prevent
efficient policy choices even m a world where information is complete.
Just because deficiencies in market outcomes create apossibility
for government action to improve matters, it does not follow that more
extensive government intervention will do betterin practice. The costs
associated with public ownership and management ofkey assets and
industries can be higher than the costs associated with inefficient
market outcornes. 3
The basic problemwith public ownership is that it can often mean
no effective ownership. Returns that would normally accrue to inves
tors or owners are instead distributed to employees and consumers in
the form of over-staffing, aboye market wages and conditions, or
subsidized prices. Such political contests often waste resources as
voters expend time and money to obtain incorne transfers that do not
represent new sources of income or wealth. More importantly, how
ever, nobody has a strong incentive to monitor enterprise performance
and ensure returns are maximized when ownership of the returns is
diffuse and uncertain.
2.1. The Importance ofInformation
Maximization ofthe gains from exchange requires accurate informa
tion on the values of goods or services to consumers. It also requires
accurate information on the costs producers incur, which, in turn,
depend on the values attached to alternative uses of particular re
sources. Generally, many different people each know only a small part
ofthis mass ofinformation.
In a market economy, individuals have an incentive to transrnit
private information to other decision-rnakers by responding to prices.
The prospect of gains frorn trading exclusive rights to use and to
transfer resources, and to deny access to others in the absence of
agreed payments, prompts individuals and firms to reveal cost and
benefit information. Prices therefore signal the value of producing
goods or services to firms, and the costs ofmeeting demands for goods
or services to consumers.
Information on current and future costs or benefits is usually
unavailable to bureaucratic planners operating under “command and
control”. The disparate individuals who know costs or benefits often
Hartley and Trengove (1986) present a formal model ofpublicly owned firms that further
elaborates on sorne ofthe issues discussed in this section.
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have no incentive to reveal what they know, and may even have strong
incentives to conceal their knowledge. Thus, in general, markets
utilize more accurate cost and benefit information than will be avail
able to bureaucratic planners.
2.2. Incentives to Respond to Information
Efficient utilization of resources requires decision-makers to respond
to cost and benefit signais. This is rarely a problem with private firms.
Even injoint stock companies, share prices provide an easily observed
and current source ofinformation about managerial performance. The
ability to purchase ownership shares and mount a take-over also
encourages managers to provide a competitive return to shareholders.
Managerial rewards and sanctions thus are closely linked to respon
siveness to cost and return signais.
Public sector managers face weaker pressures to reduce costs.
While politicians have an incentive to monitor the performance of
public sector managers, they are usually more concerned to ensure
politically powerful interest groups are satisfied than that resources
are not wasted. The link between inadequate returns on public sector
investments and a politician’s re-election chances are too weak to
make cost minimization a prime target ofpolitical monitoring.
Managers in the private sector also have an incentive to increase
revenues as well as reduce costs. Their remuneration typically reflects
both types ofchanges in company fortunes. By contrast, high informa
tion costs in the political marketplace typicallymean that public sector
managers receive much less from making good decisions than theypay
for decisions that, with hindsight, turn out to be mistakes. This
particularly applies to bad decisions with immediate and obvious
costs, or good decisions with indirect or delayed benefits.
Excessive costs in public enterprises take a number of forms.
Since a government can legislate to attenuate competition, there is an
understandable tendency for those on the public payroil to seek, and
obtain, a security of tenure that would not be possible where rival
suppliers of the service may arise. This security oftenure is likely to
diminish incentives to perform. Public enterprises are notorious for
harboring inefficient work practices. Costs that amount to “feather
bedding” can often obtain legislative approval, particularly with
threats ofstrikes in crucial monopoly service sectors. Politicians may
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also direct (or “encourage”) public enterprises to favor particular
suppliers. The beneficiaries will be a concentrated local vested interest
with political influence. The costs will be difficult to associate with the
non-competitive tendering process.
2.3. Differences in Technology
Private and public sector firms are likely to use different technologies
to supply similar services. A private firm will attempt to pre-empt
competitors by adding capacity as soon it expects it to be profitable to
do so. These additions to capacity will tend to be small since the firm
will anticipate that the next lump ofcapacity will also be built at the
earliest possible date. Private firms in a competitive industry also
continually search for new technologies that enable them to pre-empt
their competitors by reducing costs or providing a superior product.
By contrast, a public firm in a monopoly position will have a
tendency to delay construction so that it can build larger plants and
better exploit economies ofscale in the construction process. Manage
ment and monitoring costs will also be reduced when there are fewer
plants. When investments are less frequent, however, the pace of
technological change will be slower. This tendency will be exacerbated
by conservative management practicesthat are biased against experi
menting with new technologies or ways of doing things.
2.4. Capital Market Implications ofDifferent
Owners/iip Structures
Private capital markets allocate scarce investment funds to competing
projects. Government ownership interferes with this process. It can
often mean insufficient or excessive investment in infrastructure
capital.
Access to investment finance is a majorproblem formanypublicly
owned firms. The returns to capital, having been previously trans
ferred to consumers, employees or other suppliers, are unavailable to
finance investments. Public enterprises thus often depend upon gen
eral tax revenues for investment funds. The acceptability ofincurring
costs then often depends on the government fiscal position, or political
considerations, rather than economic fundamentals.
60 61Peter Hartley Reform ofthe Electricity Supply Industr-y
On the other hand, a government firm can borrow at an interest
rate below the interest rate a privatized firm would have to pay on
corporate debt, and especially below the average return investors
would demand on its corporate equity. The lower rate of return may
encourage investment in lower return projects. However, the rate of
return on government-guaranteed debt is not the appropriate cost
ofcapital for a public enterprise. The risks associated with a publicly
owned firm are not reflected in returns on government debt and do not
affect the required rate of return on that debt. In fact, an implicit or
explicit government-guarantee that taxation will be used to avoid
default on payments allows government to finance consumption or
extremely risky investments at the same low interest rate. When
private investments are very risky, the risk premium is high because
the interest or dividend payments have to be funded by the income
flow from the investment.
Private capital markets also allow those most willingto bearrisks
to do so. Risks associated with publicly owned assets are borne invol
untarily, and often at great cost, by taxpayers, recipients of other
government spending, or consumers. The use oftaxation to pay inter
est is also very expensive. The tax-induced losses from compliance and
collection costs and forgone economic activity are much higher than
the typical returns on corporate equity.
2.5. Inefficient Pricing
Efficient resource use is unlikely when prices for a marginal unit of
consumption fail to signal marginal cost. 4 Yet prices for electricity
supplied by monopoly public utilities, or prices regulated by public
bodies overseen by politicians, typically show substantial deviations
from marginal costs. Whereas the marginal cost of supply vanes by
location and time of use, tariffs typically vary by customer type, and
the purpose for which electricity is used, while time-related variations
are absent. Higher prices for lighting and other uses with a low
elasticity of demand violate the principle that the same good should
sell for the same price. 5
Another common practice is geographically uniform pricing even
though rural customers tend to be much more expensive to supply.
Such cross-subsidies appear to be more closely related to the political
influence ofdifferent consumer groups than to any economic factors.
It is also very common to use block-declining (or more recently
block-increasing) electricity tariffs that leave many customers on
mfra-marginal steps. Again, the same commodity can seli for a differ
ent price, while many consumers are inappropriately encouraged to
consume when the cost of supply is highest.
Monopolypubliclyownedutilities also oftenunderpayforelectricity
co-generated by private firms. In particular, the price paid for electric
ity supplied at a bulk supply point is typically far below the price
charged for identical electricity taken from the grid at the same point.
2.6. Non-price Rationing
A problem governments often face when they attempt to force publicly
owned firms to cross-subsidize consumers is thatthe firm mayrespond
to the low prices by Iimiting the quantity or quality of services
supplied to the subsidized group. In the electricityindustry, non-price
rationing takes the form of blackouts and brownouts (voltage or
frequency fluctuations), delays in connecting new customers to the
grid, and other forms ofpoor customer service.
Non-price rationing of demand is, however, likely to be less
efficient than higher prices. When demand is reduced by prices, the
least valuable uses of the good or service are eliminated first. Ah
consumption that is valued at less than the price being charged is
voluntarily foregone. With non-price rationing, there is no guarantee
that the least valued demand is eliminated first.
2.7. Customer Service
Publicly owned monopoly firms tend to be concerned primarily about
delivering services as specified in a statute. By contrast, private
This is not to say, however, that multi-part prices with fixed charges or mfra-marginal
pnce steps cannot be even more efficient than simple per unit prices equal to marginal costs for
ah units consumed.
Different prices for different categories of customers are sometimes justified on the
grounds thatpatterns ofdemand differ. Businesses purchasingelectricity for lighting supposedly
buy a greater proportion of their electricity during peak periods. However, higher prices for
customer categories with higher peak demand do not give incentives for each user to economize
on peak demand.
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competitive firms have an incentive to find and exploit any actions
that can raise customer satisfaction and hence revenue.
2.8. Corporatization
Many of the costs of public ownership identified aboye apply to the
most extreme form where there is continual and extensive interven
tion and oversight by politicians. The results of such intervention
include poorly specified objectives, many contradictory objectives,
external involvement in detailed management decisions and a weak
relationship between managerial performance and managerial re
wards or penalties.
Corporatization (as has been used extensively in New Zealand,
for example) can eliminate sorne of these defects. The firm is re-con
stituted along commercial unes and given a separate board of direc
tors, who are heid responsible for the achievernent ofclear, narrowed
objectives. Political directives have to be explicit and open to public
scrutiny. Managerial rewards are closely related to achievernent ofthe
stated objectives.
Nevertheless, the legislation rarely specifies as narrow acommer
cial objective for the corporatized public firm as exists for private
firms. This may partly reflect a desire to avoid the potential efficiency
losses from exploitation of monopoly power, but it does reduce incen
tives to maxirnize net benefits.
Corporatization may also be favored over privatization as a way
ofretaining cross-subsidies or comrnunity service obligations. Even if
this is not formally the case, corporatized entities are usually required
to report to a legislature that will scrutinize cross-subsidies, along
with ernployrnent and procurement practices.
Regulatory roles assigned to the corporation also can be misused
to limit competition for customers and employees and restrict the
adoption ofcompeting new technologies. Outcomes ofboth the regula
tory and commercial processes are likely to be superior when the two
roles are placed in separate organizations.
The financial consequences ofcorporatization are, however, per
haps its most serious defect. Since the government retains a financial
interest in a corporatized firm, ithas an incentive to legislate to protect
the firm frorn competition. Furtherrnore, ifthe government wishes to
retain ownership of a vital public corporation in financial distress it
has no alternative to rescuingthe firrn. Even ifa private firm isjudged
to be vital to the economy, the ability to mark down the value ofassets
and seli thern to others means that physical survival ofthe firm is not
tied to the financial survival ofits current owners. Ifthe rnanagers of
publicly owned corporations believe that government will always
rescue them from financial distress, they will have reduced incentives
to control costs.
As with ah publicly owned enterprises, corporatized pubhicly
owned firms also suifer by not having ownership claims, and returns
to investments, traded in capital markets. There are no ready sour
ces ofinformation on managerial performance. Management usually is
judged instead by reference to various accounting measures ofprofits,
costs, market expansion and so on. These accounting measures reflect
arbitrary rules, for example on depreciation or what constitutes oper
ating and capital expenses. They also focus on past performance rather
than hikely future performance as is reflected in share values.
Furtherrnore, the market return on private ownership claims (or
private debt instruments) reflects the costs ofthe risks associatedwith
the incorne flow attached to those assets. There is no comparable
source of information on the appropriate risk-adjusted rate ofreturn
on investrnents by a publicly owned firrn. It will then be difficult to
determine the efficient level ofinvestrnent by the firm. 6
2.9. Potential Offsetting Benefits ofPublic Ownership
Given these considerable defects of public relative to private owner
ship we are left to wonder why public ownership might ever have been
seen as desirable. One answer is that pubhic ownership provides
greater opportunities for rnaximizing political returns. Favored
groups of voters can be benefited as consumers, employees or other
supphiers. As with tariffs, subsidies and many other pohicies, economi
cally inefficient outcomes can persist where the benefits are concen
trated on a small number of easily organized groups while the costs
are diffused across many voters, each ofwhom pays a small amount.
6 Securitizing the income flow to the government owners ofthe publicly owned firm may
partially solve this problem. The government could float assets analogous to non-voting shares.
The marketreturn on those shares would reflectthe risks ofinvestingin the business — although
there would also be a premium to compensate for the investor’s lack ofcontrol over management
decisjons.
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Even so, democracy, or competition between political parties, will
have a tendency to limit political processes that are excessively waste
ful. The key potential offsetting benefit from public ownership is that
it avoids the efficiency costs of private monopoly. Precisely because
publicly owned firms are not profit maximizing, they do not have as
strong an incentive to exploit monopoly power. Thus, while political
oversight may produce inefficiencies, it also may avoid costs associated
with restrictions on output and accompanying excessive prices.
The balance of the costs and benefits of different institutional
arrangements will also depend on other features ofthe political, social
and economic environment. For example, an uncompetitive politi
cal system may produce less effective regulation ofprivate monopoly
power, but also greater misuse of public ownership for political pur
poses. The net result could be either an increase or a decrease in the
relative efficiency of private versus public ownership. As another
example, many of the potential capital market benefits of private
ownership could be lost if domestic financial markets are not suffi
ciently well developed. Similarly, ifpotential private investors are not
confident that property rights will be enforced they are unlikely to
commit to large capital investments. Uncertainty about regulatory
procedures or taxation arrangements also can severely attenuate
incentives to invest. On the other hand, ineffective legal, political and
capital market institutions will have far more pervasive effects than
limiting the efficiency gains from privatizing electric utilities. Such a
situation may be more an argument for reform of those institutions
than an argument against privatizing electric utilities, although the
question ofthe best sequencing ofreforms still needs to be addressed.
2.10. Privatization and Revenue Maximization
A major obstacle to successful privatization is that governments often
focus on the revenue raised by selling assets. While a low marketvalue
for assets can indicate that the government has not established an
efficient industry or regulatory structure, a very high sale price can
indicate that the market structure is monopolistic. Certainly, the
government can usually maximize the sale revenue of the assets by
maximizing the extent of monopoly power for the privatized entity.
This will be a mistake. A more efficient market outcome is the goal of
privatization. The sale ofassets should not be motivated by the ability
to retire government debt, or even worse, finance current expendi
tures, from the proceeds.
3. Technological Change
iii the Electricity Supply Industry
The arguments presented aboye regarding the balance between pri
vate and public ownership for the most part cannot explain the recent
change in attitudes toward the electricity supply industry. Klein and
Roger (1996) suggest that it is “disenchantment with the performance
of regulated or nationalized firms.” Admittedly, research from aca
demic economists, the World Bank, the OECD and others has docu
mented the relative inefficiency ofpublic as opposed to private firms. 7
Nevertheless, factors other than evidence or experience have influ
enced the change in sentiment toward the role ofregulation and public
ownership in electricity supply.
3.1. Economies ofScale in Generation, Co-generation,
Renewable Energy Sources
New technologies, particularly combined cycle gas turbines, have
greatly reduced the economies of scale in building new electricity
generating plant. There has also been extensive research into gasify
ing coal before using combined cycle gas turbine technology rather
than simply burning the coal in a furnace to produce steam.
Other trends have reinforced the tendency to build smaller gen-
4
See, for example, Bishop and Kay (1988), Boardman and Vining (1989), Shirley and
Nellis (1991), Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992), Galal, Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1994)
and Megginson, Nash and Van Randenborgh (1994). The authors ofa recent World Bank Report
(1995) note that the best empirical work compares the performance ofpublicly owned enterprises
before and after privatization, divested with publicly owned enterprises, or divested firms with
a hypothetical situation in which the same firm is assumed to continue under public ownership.
They conclude (p. 37) that:
In competitive markets this literature gives the edge to the private sector ... Where (the
enterprises) operate in uncompetitive markets, the results and interpretations are less clear.
In one study where privatizations improve welfare in 11 out of 12 cases, the authors note
(p. 38)that:
The gains carne primarily from improved productivity, increased investrnent, and better
pricing; they occurred in both competitive and monopoly markets, in part because the
regulatory framework forthe monopolies was sound enough to allow private firms to function
efficiently and to protect consumers.
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erating plant. Environmental concerns have lead to an increased
interest in using waste gases from coal mining or sewerage treatment,
waste heat from industrial processes, and small hydro-electric plants
to co-generate electricity. Most of these projects also involve low
capacity electricitygenerating plants. Finally, many other projects for
utilizingrenewable energy sources, such as wind, solar or wave power,
typically involve small capacity generating plants. Although these are
unlikely to make a significant contribution overthe next 10 to 20 years,
they are major future forces.
A more competitive wholesale electricity market has become
much more feasible as a result of the trend toward smaller capacity
plants. The more competitive market has also encouraged technologi
cal development to proceed most rapidly in smaller scale electricity
generating projects. The market is very rapidly becoming one that will
be supplied by many producers, each ofwhom will be looking for every
opportunity to increase supply when electricity prices are high. In this
competitive commercial environment, there is less ofa need for exten
sive government involvement or oversight. Governments are also not
ideally suited to bearing the increased commercial risks now inherent
in the industry.
3.2. The Falling Costs ofInformation Technology
Advances in computer technology have been essential for developing
competitive wholesale electricity markets. Optirnization problems are
solved in real time to schedule generators for supply or standby status.
In addition, computer and communications technology is needed to
monitor how much electricity has been bought or soid by each rnarket
participant.
3.3. Advances in Metering Technology
The cost of sophisticated electricity meters has also been falling
rapidly. It is now feasible for even moderate to low volume consumers
to be charged prices that reflect the time-varying marginal costs of
supply. Consumers then have an incentive to change the time atwhich
they draw power — thus evening out the demand load and lowering
the need for expensive new generating capacity. Producers who can
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supply electricity at alternative times also have an incentive to in
crease supply when demand and prices are at their peak.
Unless the wholesale market is competitive, however, sophisti
cated metering could be more harmful than beneficial. There is no
point signalingcurrent prices to consumers orproducers ifthose prices
are not truly reflective ofthe actual costs of supply.
3.4. Transmission Costs
Substantial technological changes in electricity transmission technol
ogy have also increased competition in wholesale electricity rnarkets.
The current capacity of an 800 kV alternating current (AC) line
is around 2 000 MW. An anticipated figure for future 1 200 kV lines is
5 000 MW. A realistic maximum distance for an AC transrnission
is around 1 200 km.
The recent technological breakthroughs, however, have been in
high voltage direct current (HvDc) transmission. The most powerful
HVDC transmission used today has a capacity ofaround 3 000 MW, but
an increase by a factor of at least two is within the capabilities of
existing technology. More significantly, there are no practical limita
tions ofune length for an 1w1c line. Atypical HVDC line design can have
less than 50% of the losses associated with an AC line of the same
power transfer capability. The per km construction costs of the HVDC
une are also considerably less. However, the fixed terminal costs for
HVDC equipment preclude the use of HVDC except for long unes or other
special situations.
4. The Electricity Supply Industry inAustralia 8
Australia has massive and cheap coal reserves 9 with more than 80%
of electricity being generated by coal. There are also substantial
reserves ofnatural gas, but these are largely used for supplying peak
dernands. The Snowy Mountains hydroelectric scheme and sorne
8 The summary description of the Australian industry is taken from
http://www.esaa.com.auifib.htm, which is maintained by the Electricity Supply Association of
Australia (Es).
For example, the Victorian Treasury has observed that Victoria has brown coal reserves
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smaller hydroelectric plants supply about 5% of the total electricity
demand, and up to 20% ofpeakIoads, inthe southeastAustralian grid.
The eastern Australian states have about 30 000 MW ofinstalled
capacity and total annual electricity demand on the order of 110 TWh.
Electricity accounts for more than 18% of Australian’s total final
energy consumption. The residential sector consumes around 30% of
the electricity generated while industry takes about 50%. Australian
annual per capita electricity consumption, ofaround 8400 kWh, is the
ninth largest in the world. Electricity consumption grew at an average
of 3.8% per annum over the last decade.
Australia’s industrial and residential electricity prices rank
fourth and third lowest respectively among OECD countries. They are
bettered in the developed world only by countries with abundant
hydroelectric resources.
Most ofthe load centers are located on the southeast seaboard of
Australia. Inter-State electricitytrading is through the National Elec
tricity Market (NEM) currently connecting New South Wales (Nsw), the
Australian Capital Territory (AcT), Victoria and South Australia (SA).
Queensland (Qld) is expected tojoin the NEM by 2001, while Tasmania
may also join after 2000. Western Australia and the Northern Terri
tory are not expected to be included in the national grid for some time
because oftheir isolation.
4.1. The Restructuring Process in Australia
The electricity industry in Australia has undergone substantial, but
as yet incomplete, restructuring in the last decade. The impetus for
electricity reform built throughout the 1980’s. A 1982 report to the
Victorian state government (Centre ofPolicy Studies, 1982) advocated
separating generationfrom transmission and distribution, and privat
izing the generators. The report also highlighted the inferior perfor
mance of the vertically integrated publicly owned State Electricity
Commission ofVictoria (sECv) compared with a privately owned gen
erator in the same state as well as overseas utilities using similar
technologies (see also Hartley and Trengove, 1984 and Hartley, 1984).
In the decade or so prior to the early 1990’s, the electricity
industries in the U. K., Argentina and Chile were also extensively
restructured. These reforms included wholesale markets for electric
ity, a relatively novel concept that the industry watched closely.
Although the U. S. industryhad used bilateral exchanges ofelectricity
to minimize production costs, even to this day the U. S. has not
introduced a national multilateral wholesale trading market.
The privatization ofmany former public enterprises in the U. K.
was closely watched in Australia, as was the privatization and corpo
ratization of many enterprises in New Zealand. Both Australia and
New Zealand also embarked on programs of trade liberalization
and economic reform in other sectors of their economies throughout
the 1980’s.
An Industry Commission report (Industry Commission, 1991)
documented the inferior productivity ofAustralian electricity utilities
relative to foreign privately owned counterparts. Poor performance by
the monopolyutilities owned bythe state governments came to be seen
as a serious impediment to further economic reform in Australia.
On 21-22 November 1991, a meeting of state Ieaders in Adelaide
agreed that the Trade Practices Act’° (administered by the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission or ACCC) should be inde
pendently reviewed to determine its capacity to secure a national
competition policy. The subsequent Inquiry (Hilmer Committee, 1993)
drew attention to excess market power heid by public monopolies, such
as in electricity supply, and showed how this is likely to impede the
introduction of effective competition. It called for monopolies to be
dismantied and for regulatory restrictions on competition to be removed.
The Hilmer Report identifled three separate types of structural
reform that may be required in any particular industry:
• The separation ofregulatory and commercial functions to avoid
a potential conflict ofinterest in a competitive market.
• The separation ofnatural monopoly elements from potentially
competitive activities, because control over access to a natural
monopoly might be used to stifle competition, or deter new
entrants into the market.
• The separation ofpotentially competitive activities by splitting
entitieswith substantial marketpowerinto anumber ofdistinct
competing entities.
After accepting the conclusions of the Hilmer Report ah states
and territories, meeting as the Council of Australian Governments
10 The Trade Fractices Act governs anti-competitive market behavior in Australia and in
its original form exempted state government businesaes from ita purview.
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(coAG), agreed in April 1995 to promote competitive market conditions
under the National Competition Poiicy Agreements (“NcP Agree
ments”). The NCP Agreements established a set of principies for the
structural reform, and oversight ofprices, ofpublic monopolies.
In May 1996, the governments of NSW, Victoria, Qid, SA and the
ACT executed an inter-governmental agreement to introduce the Na
tional Electricity Market (NEM) through legislation (“the National
Electricity Law”) to apply in eachjurisdiction. The guiding objectives
in building the NEM were determined by the NCP Agreements and
included:
• Freedom of choice for electricity buyers.
• Non-discriminatory access to the interconnected transmission
and distribution networks.
• Merit order dispatch based on bid price.
• No discriminatory legislative or reguiatory barriers to entry for
new participants in electricity generation or retail supply.
• No barriers to inter-state or intra-state trade.
• Uniform and cost reflective grid pricing.
The first stages ofthe NEM commenced Aprii 1997. Foilowing the
Code being authorized and accepted as an access undertaking by
the ACCC, the fuily operative nationai market started in eariy 1998.
The structure ofthe NEM is iliustrated in Figure 4 (taken from Treas
ury and Finance, 1997).
The Nationai Electricity Market Code (the NEM Code) that gov
erns the operation ofthe NEM provides for:
• Prudential and technical requirements that need to be met to
participate in the market.
• Daily bidding by generators of a price schedule at which they
are willing to supply, and rules for the dispatch of generators
on afive-minutedispatch cycle accordingto marketdemand and
the bid price schedules.
• Determination of spot prices for electricity in the wholesale
market as a time-weighted average of ah five-minute dispatch
prices in each thirty-minute trading interval.
• Establishment ofthe Nationai Electricity Market Management








NEMMCO powers ofintervention to prevent avoidable load shed
ding.
Requirements and obligations for the production and publica
tion ofmarket information.
The conditions and procedures for market suspension.
The procedure for making settiements between buyers and
sellers based on spot prices and the quantities bought and soid
during each half-hour settiement period.
The minimum spot price is zero. The maximum spot price is the
Value ofLost Load (voLL), which is set by the NEM Code Administrator
and is currently $A5 000 per MWh.
To be eligible to participate in the NEM, a generator must have at
least 30 MW capacity at the sent out point connected to the national
grid. Generators must accept payments at the spot price for any part
of their generation that is dispatched. NEM customers also must pay
the spot market price for any output they take from the national pooh.
Sellers and buyers can also directly negotiate long term contracts.
There is no direct physical transfer between the two parties under
contract. Sellers and buyers would in effect seli to and buy from
the p001 at the spot price. Any difference between the spot price and
r
Reform ofthe Electricity Supply Industry



















72 73Peter Hartley Reform ofthe Electricity Supply Industry
the contract price is then payable to the party who would be worse off
at the spot price compared to the contract price.
Buyers and sellers can also trade standardized forward contracts
through the Sydney Futures Exchange. Traders in financial forward
market contracts can also participate in the national wholesale elec
tricity market after paying registration fees.
Gerierators and customers also pay transmission charges that
depend on the average costs over a “typical” year ofgettingtheir power
either to or from Sydney or Melbourne (where two pool prices are
deemed to apply). The ACCC regulates transmission charges. State
governments regulate analogous “distribution charges”forusinglower
voltage networks.
The state governments also regulate retail electricity prices for
customers who are not yet eligible to select suppliers. As ofJuly 1998,
customers in NSW and Victoria whose annual consumption exceeds 160
MWh, and who have a special meter, can select competing suppliers.
Ifthey choose a supplier other than the local distributor, they have to
pay a regulated charge for using the local distributor’s distribution
network.
The NEM Code requires a public and transparent process for
implementing any changes to the transmission grid. Previously such
deliberations were undertaken within the confines of the vertically
integrated monopoly electricity suppliers. The NEM Code also envis
ages “entrepreneurial” interconnects. There are location specific com
ponents in transmission prices, and businesses will be allowed to
propose ñew unes, and charge those using the facility, where they spot
an opportunity for profit. However, the precise means ofarranging for
such charges has not been fully explored.
A fundamental difficulty in implementing a more market-driven
approach to transmission investments is that the current NEM Code
does not produce transmission prices that adequately reflect the
marginal value of changes to the transmission system. A market
driven system would require a competitive market for electricity (and
also for reactive power) 1 ’ at each “node” on the transmission grid. 12
Moreover, the system controller can direct new developments and
augmentations with the costs borne collectively, albeit after a public
investigative process. A “free” resource of this nature tends to freeze
out the opportunities for profit-driven activity.
4.2. Restructuring ofthe Industry in Victoria
Meanwhile, in parallel with the national developments, radical reform
was occurring in the state ofVictoria. A new government was elected
in 1992 following a fiscal crisis promoted by the excessive spending of
the previous administration. The credit rating ofthe state government
had been substantially downgraded and interest payments on state
debt were a significant part ofannual government expenditures.
The analysis of the state electricity industry that had been
completed over the previous decade provided a basis for reform. By
1993, the SECV was carrying almost $A10 billion of debt, and 30% of
its revenue went to pay interest on that debt. Electricity prices in
Victoria were 40% aboye the then most efficientAustralian state (Qld)
and well short of world’s best practice, despite Victoria having an
abundance of relatively low-cost brown coal and large natural gas
reserves. Construction costs ofnew plant were 60% higher thanwould
be expected under best practice, while generation availability was
around 65% compared to current availability standards in excess of
90% (see Treasury and Finance, 1997).
The new government decided to dismantie and privatize the
formerly publicly owned and vertically integrated SECV. In August
1993, the SECV was divided into transmission, generation and distri
bution entities. Followingcorporatization ofthese entities, substantial
efficiency gains were realized. In 1995, generation and distribution
were further disaggregated before being privatized through trade
sales. Many ofthe winning bidders were consortia linking Australian
firms with foreign (particularly U. S. and U. K.) private utilities.
As ofmid-1998, almost ah ofthe former SECV generating stations
11 This is needed to ensure the electrical stability of the transmission system. It is not
even traded in the wholesale market at this stage. Perhaps the best that could be hoped for in
this regard is that options for future market developments are not precluded by the existing
arrangements.
2 The distributors have resisted the development of separate “nodal prices” that depend
on the time ofday. They prefer local prices that are simple “mark-ups” on “representative” pool
prices at a small number of nodes with well-developed futures markets based on the prices prevailing at those “representative” nodes. With time-dependent nodal prices, the differential between local and “representative” prices would vary over time, decreasing hedging opportuni ties and increasing risks. The difficulties associated with such completely decentralised prices have probably been over-stated, but no electricity system in the world has yet developed a fully operational market that truly reflects transmission costs.
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have been sold. There are now four major coal-fired, privately owned
generating stations supplying electricity to NEM from Victoria. Sorne
ofthe new owners have spent substantial sums restoring the stations
to leveis of efficiency that have astonished industry observers.’
There are also two smaller coal-fired stations, one of which was
already privately owned before the SECV was privatized, and three
relatively small hydroelectric stations (also now in private hands). The
two relatively small gas-fired stations remaining in government own
ership will be soid at the end of 1998. The hydroelectric capacity ofthe
Snowy Mountains scheme will also be established as a corporatized
entity in 1998 and allowed to trade into the national market on a
commercial basis.
The interconnector between Victoria and NSW currently has a
capacity of 1 500 MW (roughly equal to the capacity ofone ofthe large
coal-fired stations) while up to 300 MW can be supplied from SA.
Following construction ofan undersea link, from 2 001 up to 300 MW
ofhydroelectric power will also be able to be imported from Tasmania.
Several small, independent power producers also operate co-genera
tion facilities in Victoria.
A competitive wholesale market for electricitywas started inJuly
1994, with interstate customers in NSW, SA and the ACT allowed to
participate from May 1997. Because ofthe largenumber ofcompetitors
supplying to this market, very little gaminghas been seen particularly
by comparison with the U. K. market where the government created
an effective duopoly. The Victorian experience has shown that there
is rnuch to be gained and little to be lost (in terms ofeconomies ofscale
or scope) by having each generating station owned by a different
private firm. As the Victorian Treasury and Finance Department
(1997) notes:
Experience since disaggregation oftheVictoriangenerationindustryhas
demonstrated that the generators have performed well in terms of:
• increasing production efficiency;
• increasing availability and reliability;
• reducing operating costs;
One ofthe stations, Hazelwood, which is over thirty years oid, had been scheduled for
decommissioning by the scv. However, according to its new owners (http://www.hazelwood-po
wer.com.au/), “the future ofHazelwood appears to be a long one. In fact, our planners are already
Iooking at mining issues and plant maintenance scheduies forty years from now”.
• reducing capital expenditure; and
• achieving reduced prices and improved profitability.
Such gains were unlikely to have been achieved with fewer generation
companies.
Notwithstanding the results from (defective) econometric analy
ses, no material loss of economies of scale appears to result from
disaggregation to the plant level.
The government also privatized the high voltage transmission
grid in Victoria in 1997. The new private owner, PowerNet Victoria
(pNv), is responsible for maintenance to ensure the existing high
voltage transmission network performs to required standards, and
also for building any extensions to that network that have been
approved by the Victorian Power Exchange (vpx). The vx is an
independent statutory authority, which was established in 1993 to
manage the wholesale electricity market and ensure system security.
The Victorian Department ofTreasury and Finance (1997) explained
the rationale behind the creation ofPowerNet and the vx as follows:
The Victorian electricity supply industry was the first in the world to
separate the transmission and system control and market functions.
Transmission is a regulated monopoly, with a key factor in setting PNV’s
transmission charges being the value ofPNV’s transmission assets. This
may give PNV incentives to favor investment in transmission assets over
system improvementsthat do not increase PNV’s asset base. To avoid this
potential conflict, the investment decision-making role has been separa
ted from transmission ownership and placed with ‘iPx. ‘iPX is suited to
this independent role because it lacks direct commercial interests which
favor any particular network solution. vPx is specifically structured to be
able to assess the trade-offs between investment options in an inde
pendent manner. There are also strong synergies between the inves
tment decision role and vPx’s other roles.
Under the NEM many of vix’s functions and responsibilities will
be transferred to NEMMCO. From around mid 1998, transmission plan
ning and other residual activities now carried out by ‘ipx will be
handied by a new statutory corporation, Victorian Energy Networks
Corporation (VEN Corp).
The distribution business of the SECV was separated into five
regionally based and now privately owned businesses. Each of these
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businesses has an effective monopoly over the distribution network
within its region and a monopoly to retail electricityto non-contestable
customers within its region. The monopoly over customers will be
phased out in accordance with a timetable set by the Victorian Gov
ernment. Customers with demand aboye 5 MW (about 47) were given
choice in December 1994, and customers with demand aboye 1 MW
(about 330) in July 1995. In July 1996, choice was extended to about
2 000 customers consuming over 750 MWh of electricity each year.
From 1 July 1998, choice will extend to more than 8 000 customers
consuming more than 160 MWh each year. Finally, from January 2001,
ah of Victoria’s more than 2 million electricity customers, including
domestic customers, will be able to choose their electricity retailer.
Customers who contract with a supplier other than their local
distributor need to have a half-hourly meter installed, with a comrnu
nications link to the market settlement system. The link enables the
meter to be read remotely, for the purpose of settling the wholesale
market. Contestable customers can buy from other retailers with a
distributionfranchise orregisteredindependent traders. As ofNovern
ber 1997, there were 12 ofthe latter traders, many ofthem electricity
distributors from other Austrahian states.
There has been real competition for contestable customers inVic
toria. One of the distributors, Powercor reports (http:llwww.upl.com)
that, as of December 31, 1996, they heid about 46% of Victoria’s
contestable market (including contestable customers in their own
area). Overahi, more than 40% of contestable customers have con
tracted for power with a non-host retailer. This is similar to the U. K.
experience, but in New Zealand only 7.5% ofpower is soid by a non-host
retailer. This may be because ah customers in New Zealand are
contestable and it is difficult for small users to justify the added
metering costs. This is likely to change, however, as metering costs
fail (Treasury, NSW, 1996).
The proceeds from the privatization process in Victoria were all
used to retire debt. The assets were sold for world record prices
— almost $A23 billion ($U.S.14 bihlion) for the five distributors, three
brown coal generators, minor hydro-electric assets and Victoria’s high
voltage electricity transmission network. 1 The resulting reduction in
State debt has saved Victorians more than $700 million in interest
payments in 1996/1997, allowingstate taxes to be reduced and improv
ing the state government’s credit rating(Treasury and Finance, 1997).
The Australian experience has shown that creating a significant
number of competing players in the generation market, with an
independent transmission grid, and creating capacities for customers
to choose their distribution company or retailer, can substantiahly
reduce prices. While precise information is not readily available for
commercial reasons, the press and the Office ofthe Regulator General
(1997) have reported that electricity prices for contestable customers
in Victoria have fallen about 10% on average and up to 40% for sorne
customers. The pool price for wholesale electricity now averages close
to $A15 per MWh (about US1 per kWh) compared with about $A40
at the start of the Victorian p001 and $A45-60 for bulk supply in NSW
before deregulation. This price may rise, however, as more power is
bought at pool prices rather than on contract.
Table 1. Measures ofService Quahity in the Victorian
Electricity Industry
1990/1991 1993/1994 1996
Average system outage (minutes)* 490 251.7 175
Availability ofgenerators 79.8 82.7 92
Monthly residential disconnections 2 800 1 380
The Victorian process has also shown that privatization and cost
reduction need not be at the expense of customer service.’ 5 Table 1
provides sorne indicative measures of supply quality in the Victorian
industry in the period before and after privatization. It is notable that
privatization has reduced the number of disconnections for non-pay
ment. Conscious oftheir image in the communities they serve, and of
the scope to save costs of reconnection (the charges for which are
commonly set below their costs), the private businesses have taken
steps to avoid disconnecting customers.
14 Participants in the process have toid me that the high prices werejustified because the
competitive market structure gaye buyers confidence that the government would not intervene
and modi5’ the rules or regulations in the future.
15 A reduction in product quality needs not always be an inferior outcome for consumers. It is also not clear that oil consumers should bear the increased costs ofhigher system reliability that might only be desired by sorne.
1
1
*Source: Office ofthe Regulator General in Victoria. Measurements prior to 1994 exciuded the
12% of electricity distributed through the municipal authorities, which were generally far infe
rior to the SECV.
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The adjustment to privatization and competition in Victoria has
also imposed costs on sorne. The Latrobe Valley (where the larger
brown coal generating stations are located) has experienced substan
tial reductions in electricity and coal miningjobs, with flow-on effects
in other industries. In the past, many state governrnents in Australia
insulated their electricity businesses from competition as means of
providing more jobs than were required for commercial operations.
However, whenever government insulates businesses from competi
tion and structural change the resulting inefficiencies are manifest in
higher prices for their consumers and reduced competitiveness for
their business customers. State governrnents in effect both taxed
consumers through excessive electricity prices and subsidized the
operations of their utilities by accepting a low rate of return on the
assets. In Victoria, the $A150 million net profit of the SECV in 1992
represented a return of less than one per cent on the $A23 billion at
which the various businesses are valued. This poor performance is
compounded by the fact that the SECV charged prices that were far
higher than justified in a comrnercial market.
Victoria’s northern neighbor, NSW, has followed a different path in
reforming its electricity supply industry. Prior to the reforms of the
1990s, the distribution businesses in NSWwere operated as 25 separate
entities owned by local and municipal governments. Apart from sorne
private co-generation in the large industrial centers, the generating
capacity was a state-owned monopoly, Pacific Power.
In July 1991, Pacific Power introduced an internal electricity
market known as ELEX. Although this market evolved in detail over
several years, it was basically a wholesale spot generation market in
which output was purchased at spot prices within Pacific Power and
on-soid to distributors and to direct custorners under previously
agreed tariffarrangements.
As part of the ELEX market, business unit profit centers and
internal charging were instituted, allowing the performance of the
different units to be more easily compared. The less efficient gener
ators within Pacific Power were pressured to reduce their costs,
resulting in increased plant availability, reduced start-up tirnes, re
duced fuel oil usage, and other irnprovements in operating efficiencies.
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The ELEX market also provided experience trading in a wholesale
electricity market prior to the introduction ofthe NEM.
As a step towards setting up the NEM, the states agreed to split
their vertically integrated power authorities into transmission and
generation units. In NSW, Pacific Grid was first forrned as a wholly
owned transmission network subsidiary of Pacific Power. The high
voltage (over 132 MW) transmission network assets were transferred
to this entity, which was fully separated as a statutory authority (now
known as TransGrid) in February 1995.
TransGrid is responsible both for network planning, and for the
power exchange and system security services. In Victoria these func
tions are split between PowerNet and vpx. Housing responsibility for
system security and transmission network augmentation within one
entity, as in NSW, gives rise to perverse incentives, particularly when
augmentations are paid for by a levy on other bodies.
In May 1995, following the April, 1995, COAG meeting, the NSW
government issued an Electricity Reforrn Statement. This statement
detailed its position on restructuringthe industry in NSW. The reforms
included establishing an interirn state wholesale electricity market,
pending the implementation ofnational market arrangements.
On 30 June, 1995, an amendment to the ElectricityTransmission
AuthorityActrequired TransGrid to implement awholesale electricity
market in NSW by the first quarter in 1996. At the same time, the
government announced the amalgamation of the 25 distribution
authorities in NSW into six larger state-owned corporations, each of
which has financially separate retail and distribution functions. Sub
sequently, it announced that two generation corporations Macquarie
Generation and Delta Power would be split from Pacific Power. In
choosing to form portfolios of generators, the NSW government was
influenced by (flawed) econometric studies claiming to find economies
of scale beyond a single generating station. Delta has four stations
with a total capacity of 4 240 MW, Macquarie has two stations with
4 640 MW capacity while Pacific Power was left with the newest
station, which can generate 2 640 MW, together with a 5 MW wind
farm and sorne hydroelectric plant. Pacific Power also has plans to add
about 450 MW ofgas-fired plant. Delta and Macquarie each have over
twice the capacity of the largest Victorian generator and over three
times the capacity ofthe largest Queensland generator.
In March 1996, the six NSW distributors and the two new gener
ators were corporatized and the first stage of the NSW wholesale
a
1
4.3. Electricity Reforms in NSW
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electricity market commenced. Generators bid in a limited fashion to
produce a supply schedule, with trading taking place at an adminis
tered price. From May 1996, the pool price was set by supply and
demand and participants could enter into forward contracts using the
Sydney Futures Exchange. This market remained in place until re-
placed by the NEM in the middle of 1997.
Meanwhile, in June 1996 the NSW Electricity Reform Taskforce
released recommendations for introducing competition into the retail
electricity market. Under these proposals, successively smaller cus
tomers were allowed to bypass their local electricity distributor
and purchase directly from the wholesale market. The timetable
adopted was:
• October 1996 - customers with annual consumption in excess of
40 GWh.
• April 1997 - customers with annual consumption in excess of
4 GWh.
• July 1997 - customers with annual consumption in excess of
750 MWh.
• July 1998 - customers with annual consumption in excess of
160 MWh.
• July 1999 - zero threshold.
Following corporatization, the NSW electricity businesses reduced
costs largely by reducing employment by between 10 and 25%. The
failure of the largest distributor, Energy Australia, to downsize fur
ther has, however, been criticized. The Australian Financial Review
reported that a consultant recommended that Energy Australia re
duce its workforce from 3 800 to 1 800 in order to obtain costs competi
tive with its private sector rivais from Victoria. The board’s rejection
ofthis led to the resignation ofthe CEO.
In 1997, the NSW government floated the idea of privatizing the
electricity generating companies. NSW government revenue from
its electricity assets in 1997/98 is estimated to be $A656 million in
dividends plus $A221 million in tax equivalent payments. In early
1997, Arthur Andersen valued the assets at $A22 billion. The returns
thereforerepresent a lessthan a 4% return on capital. The $A22 billion
estimate rnay, however, be conservative. Since the NSW industry is one
third larger than that ofVictoria, $A30 billion might be expected. At
that valuation, the present return is a little under 3%. Even placing
82
$A22 billion from electricity asset sales into long term Australian
government bonds would yield $A1540 million per annum at 1997
interest rates. Despite these and other argurnents offered to the
government of NSW at the time, the idea ofprivatization was rejected
by the majority of party members including in particular the trade
unions representing the electricity workers.
Detailed information on the operation ofthe NEM inAustralia is readily
available on the web. Weekly and monthly reports are available at
http://electricity.net.au/vpx.htrnl. Figure 5 shows the system demands
for electricity in the two states for the week ending August 8, 1998,
and, at the bottom ofthe graph, the wholesale prices in the two states.
Figure 6 shows the transfer of electricity between Victoria and
NSW over the same week. During the week various events constrained
the interchange from Victoria to NSW for 88 half-hour periods, reduc
ing the flow of electricity north. While sorne weeks have significant
amounts ofelectricity flowing south as well as north, in almost every
week that the NEM has been operatingthere has been a substantial net
shipment ofelectricity from Victoria north.
The Victorian spot price was normally slightly below the NSW
price, but virtually never aboye it. We should expect to find simi
lar prices except when there is a constraint on the transfer of power
between the two systems. Ifthe constraint applies to shippingelectric
ity north, the Victorian price will be lower and vice versa.
While spot electricity prices in NSW and Victoria are now more or
iess equalized by trade between the states, only a srnall fraction of
electricity is purchased on that basis. Much of it is still purchased
under contracts at prices that are lower inVictoria, reflectingthe more
competitivemarket inthat state. However, wholesale electricityprices
should converge toward the spot prices over time.
Figure 5 also reveals a relationship between system demands and
the wholesale price. Prices tend to be higher when demand is higher.
4.4. Operation ofthe Market between NSW and Victoria
1
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4.5. Generation Costs in NSWand Victoria
A particular “problem” for NSW is that its coal is more valuable than
the brown coal in Victoria. While NSW black coal generators convert
more coal to energy than do the Victorian brown coal generators, the
cost of coal in NSW more than compensates for the difference. Coal
mined in NSW is exported as both steaming and coking coal while
Victoria’s brown coal is unsafe to transport by ship since it can
spontaneously combust. The cost ofusing brown coal in Victoria is the
very low extraction cost 16 and this is well below the export price of NSW
coal. Furthermore, the privatization program in Victoria, and the
associated regulatory reform, has permanently reduced operating
costs relative to NSW.
Tasman Asia Pacific has recently measured the productivity and
costs of the electricity supply industries in Australia. The analysis
provides some simple indicators ofthe productivity ofcapital andlabor
in the NSW and Victorian industries. These have been given in Table 2.
Table 2. Electricity Partial Capital and Labor
Productivity Indicators
1992-1993 1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996
GWh soidper employee
NSW 2.55 2.84 na 3.68
Wc 3.22 4.44 na 4.65
Capacity factor
NSW 55.5 53.2 52.7 53.8
WC 60.8 64.3 na 63.4
Load factor
NSW 64.6 64.9 63.2 64.5
vic 69.9 na 67.6 74.5
The explanation ofthe measures in Table 2 follows.
GWh soidper employee is an indicator oflabor productivity. The
labor needed to supply a given amount of energy also depends, how
The Victorian deposits are mined from open cut pits adjacent to the power stations. In
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ever, on other factors such as the density ofcustomers, total length of
network wires per customer, demand per customer and so on. The
Victorian, but not the NSW, data also includes employees engaged in
coal mining operations.
The capacity factor reflects average utilization of available gen
erating capacity. It is calculated as the ratio of GWh generated
annually to effective capacity in place (expressed as a percentage). A
low capacity factor could indicate excessive plant failure, but it will
also crucially depend on the shape of the demand load curve. If peak
electricity demands differ greatly from average demand, the capacity
factor will be low. The shape of the demand load curve will be
partly influenced by factors beyond the control of the industry (such
as weather patterns) but may also be significantly affected by electric
ity prices.
The load factor reflects fluctuations in the use of capital due to
seasonal and daily fluctuations in demand. It is measured as the ratio
ofannual generation to the peak generated load (that is, peak demand
* 8 760 hours per annum).
The indicators presented in Table 2 obviously cannot be taken as
proof of the relative productivity ofthe two industries. Each ofthese
measures suggests, however, that theVictorian industryis performing
better than its NSW counterpart, and that privatization in Victoria has
yielded additional efficiency gains beyond those associated with corpora
tization. Furthermore, there is a long historyofprivate sectorgenerators
showing far greater operational efficiency than public sector generators.
In Victoria, the privately owned and relatively small Anglesea power
station consistently outperformed newer SECV stations. In more recent
years the Loy Yang B station operated by Mission Energy has shown
better labor productivity and availability factors than other Victorian
generators. Since privatization, ah three ofthe remaining major former
SECV generators have shown marked improvements in efficiency as
measured by GWh per employee and availability factors.
In terms of availability, five years ago both state systems ayer
aged about 80% and have shownvast improvements over recentyears.
Three of the privatized Victorian brown coal generators now operate
at over 95% availability, which is close to world’s best practice. Im
pressive gains have also been made by NSW generators, though only
one presently operates at the 95% availability level.
Forced outagerates have shown comparable leveis ofimprovement
in both states, although again the rates are somewhat higher in NSW.
4.6. Distributioa in NSW and Victoria
Table 3 shows the relative size ofVictorian and NSW retailers. There
has been considerable debate about the optimum size for distributors
and retailers. A complication in the debate is that the optimum size is
dictated partly by geography and customer profiles.
World wide, there is a vast range ofdistributor sizes. In Switzer
land, Norway and New Zealand, most distribution is undertaken
efficiently by businesses that are smaller than ah NSW distributors
other than Australian Inland Energy.
In New Zealand, a 1989 Ministry of Energy report found the
optimum size of distributors to be about 2 000 GWh. A report by
London Economics (Treasury, NSW, 1994) showed much higher leveis
of scale economies — around 25 000 GWh or halfthe total NSW load.
Again, however, this evidence is not persuasive in so far as it does not
adequatelydistinguishbetween shortrun operating costs and longrun
capital expansion costs.
Victoria formed five distributors in an attempt to balance com
petitive pressures with a need to give each distributor a significant
metropolitan and industrial load and a size that would attract inter
national buyers. The Victorian distribution businesses appear to have
demonstrated that there are no economies ofscale beyond the 200 000
plus customer size. The smaller businesses consider that improved
work practices and savings in overhead costs have resulted from
bringing supervisory leveis closer to the working operations.
While NSW amalgamated its previous 25 electricity distribution
businesses into six firms, it has also opened the retail market to
competition both between these firms and with new businesses. How
ever, there are risks in creating a dominant retailer like Energy
Australia in that it could exercise undue market power over customer
information and une charges that could give it an unfair advantage
over its competitors. Furthermore, the effectiveness of access re-
gimes as a means of promoting competition in electricity retailing is
debatable.
5. Concluding Remarks
Reform of the Australian electricity supply system is an ongoing
process. While further experience with the new structure is needed
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United Energy 527 6.4
Eastern Energy 470 5.1
NSW
Energy Australia 1 306 20.0
Integral Energy 681 11.8
NorthPower 336 3.4
Advance Energy 113 1.77
Energy South 218 3.4
Australian Inland Energy 21 0.3
before the effectiveness ofthe reforms can be judged definitively, the
experience to date nevertheless holds many lessons for othercountries
seeking to reform their electricity industry.
Corporatization in both NSW and Victoria delivered substantial
cost savings relative to the oid integrated pubiic enterprise model,
while privatization in Victoria yielded additional cost savings on top
ofthose achieved under corporatization. These cost savings have also
resulted in lower electricity prices without any deterioration in service
quality. In fact, the privatized firms appear to be providing better
service than the public enterprises they replaced.
The outcomes in Victoria and NSW also appear to refute the
existence of economies of scale in electricity generation beyond
the generating station level. Certainly, the privatized generators in
Victoria are competing extremely well against the corporatized port
folios ofgenerators in NSW. Since there is unambiguous evidence from
the U. K. that fewer generators lead to efficiency losses from gaming
in the wholesale electricity market, however, any country embarking
on privatization and reform would be well-advised to seli each gener
ating station as a separate firm.
Reform ofthe Electricity Supply Industry
The wholesale electricity market, along with competition for
customers and new metering technology, has also meant that electric
ity consumers in Australia now face prices that are more reflective of
marginal costs. It is perhaps too early to obtain definitive evidence
of demand shifting in response to these new pricing regimes but
anecdotal reports abound.
Despitethe current over-capacity in the Australian supply indus
try there has also been renewed interest in co-generation from a
number offirms. Co-generators can 110W benefit much more frorn high
peak load prices then used to be the case in the past.
Perhaps the biggest remaining question is the effect of the new
environment on long term investment. A backlog ofpotentially profit
able co-generation projects means that new generation capacity will
probably be added in small increments for sorne time. The interesting
question is whether another large coal-fired plant will eventually be
built or whether all new capacity will involve smaller plants than the
ones currently in use.
It will also be very interesting to see how the NEM deals with
investrnent in new transmission capacity. The currentpricing formula
for transmission services does not send the right signals to potential
entrepreneurs interested in extending the grid. Market participants
may need to become comfortable with the NEM before innovations such
as time of day nodal pricing, or a market in reactive power, can be
introduced.
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Abstract: This paper reviews the arguments about market foreclosure — as
an incentive for vertical agreements between upstream and downstream
firms — and its effects on welfare. We consider that downstream flrms
compete in quantities in the final good market and upstream firms com
pete in quantities in the intermediate good market. In this context we show
that a vertical agreement must not contemplate market foreclosure, that
is, upstream firms continues participating in intermediate market. Re
garding antitrust policy, we show that even vertical agreements aimed at
increasing input price faced by otherfirms may be positive from thewelfare
viewpoint.
Resumen: Este artículo revisa los argumentos respecto a la cerradura de
mercado, como un incentivo a la formación de acuerdos verticales entre
empresas fabricantes de un productointermedio y empresas fabricantes de
un producto final, y sus efectos en el bienestar. Suponemos que tanto los
fabricantes del producto final como los del producto intermedio compiten
en cantidades en sus respectivos mercados. En este contexto, mostramos
que un acuerdo vertical no debe considerar la cerradura de mercado, esto
es, las empresas continúan participando en el mercado intermedio. Res
pecto a políticas antimonopolio, mostramos que incluso los acuerdos verti
cales enfocados a incrementar el precio de mercado del producto intermedio
pueden ser positivos desde el punto de vista del bienestar.
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